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The blast from North Korea’s relatively diminutive nuclear test has been nearly drowned out this week by the sound of pundits chattering.  But amidst all the talk, nary a word has been said about the bombshell dropped by former Secretary of State James Baker on Monday.  Appearing on Comedy Central’s The Daily Show to plug his new book, Baker casually disclosed that North Korea has had a crude nuclear capability since the time that the first President Bush was in office.  That’s George H.W. Bush!

“They had a rudimentary nuclear weapon, way back in the days when I was secretary of state,” Baker said.  “But now this is a more advanced one, evidently.”

That certainly sounds like news.  Yet there has been no follow-up.  Instead we have had an endless parade of Republican and Democratic mouthpieces trying to assign blame for Kim Jong-il’s October Surprise to either the current President Bush or President Clinton, depending on which side they shill for.  None have suggested that the first President Bush might bear some of the responsibility.

At a minimum, Baker’s revelation raises the question of what, if anything, the United States attempted to do about the bomb it apparently knew North Korea possessed all those many years ago.  Baker gave no hint on the subject.  It is known, however, that when Bush I served as Vice President under Ronald Reagan, an initiative existed that, had it been pursued, might have provided the United States with some leverage in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

As a National Security News Service investigation revealed several years ago, President Reagan’s first CIA director, William Casey, had established a back-channel to North Korea’s reclusive leadership.  Although the Reagan-Bush administration, like the current Bush administration, shunned direct dealings with Pyongyang, shortly after Reagan took office in 1982 Casey began sending U.S. businessman and sometimes-CIA-asset William Zylka as a secret emissary to the North.  Zylka’s missions, later joined by retired Army Gen. Erle Cocke, eventually showed signs of paying off.  By 1987 there was talk of cultural exchanges between the U.S. and North Korea and the possibility of a future peace treaty.  But by then the Iran-Contra scandal had exploded; Casey had become a pariah, then developed cancer and died.  The secret talks with North Korea died with him.  Zylka tried repeatedly—first during the latter stages of the Reagan administration and then during the first Bush administration—to revive them, but without success.  As with the current Bush administration, any suggestion of solving problems through dialogue was treated with disdain.

Diplomacy got a second chance when the Clinton administration took office.  Talks with the North Koreans resulted in a 1994 agreement under which Pyongyang placed a freeze on its production of plutonium.  While that agreement had significant problems, it at least slowed down North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and suggested that further negotiations were in order as part of an effort to convince Pyongyang to shut down the program altogether.  That possibility evaporated when the current Bush administration took office in 2001.  The Bush team quickly declared North Korea part of the axis of evil, threatened it with military action, and refused to engage in further bi-lateral discussions.  The results have been predictable.

At the time President Bush took power, North Korea was believed to have enough plutonium for one or possibly two nuclear weapons, according to an analysis [pdf] by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Studies.  Now, just over five years later, Pyongyang is thought to have enough material for as many as 13 bombs, and the number could grow to as many as 17 by 2008.  In the meantime, North Korea has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, resumed plutonium reprocessing, taken to launching ballistic missiles and, now, to testing nuclear devices.  Some intelligence analysts fear that, having apparently proven that he has a nuclear capability, the Dear Leader may attempt to sell the technology to other rogue states, or to terrorist organizations.

It would seem it’s time for a new approach.  Yet James Baker doesn’t seem to think so.  Although throughout his book tour Baker has repeatedly said, in a comment that has received far more attention than his North Korean bomb revelation, that he believes in “talking to your enemies” and that it is “not appeasement” to do so, he apparently has had a change of heart since North Korea joined the nuclear club.  During his appearance on The Daily Show the day after the North Korean test, Baker said: “I’m not sure we ought to sit down and talk bi-laterally with North Korea.  We shouldn’t. . . . You can’t trust them.”  But that is the approach that led us to the current crisis.  Perhaps it is time reporters sat down to talk with Mr. Baker.  He seems to have a lot to say these days.

To view James Baker’s appearance on the Daily Show see:  http://www.comedycentral.com/shows/the_daily_show/videos/celebrity_interviews/index.jhtml or http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Daily+Show+James+Baker&search=Search

To read about Willam Zylka’s secret contacts with North Korea, see: Warren P. Strobel; Kevin Whitelaw; Thomas Omestad; David E. Kaplan, “A minuet with a missile,” U.S. News & World Report, August 9, 1999, Pg. 30.

For the Institute for Science and International Studies’ report on North Korea, see: David Albright and Paul Brannan, “ISIS Report on the DPRK: The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006,” June 26, 2006.  (http://isis-online.org/publications/dprk/index.html)

For James Baker’s comments about his belief in “talking to your enemies,” see: ABC, “This Week,” October 8, 2006.