As the Iran-Iraq war ground on – all but ignored by the Western media – US arms and military equipment for the Shah’s old weapons flowed through Israel to Iran while arms from Russia, France, and the United Kingdom flowed into Iraq through American-sponsored arms dealer Sarkis Soghanalian.
Soghanalian had to give business partnerships for his Iraqi ventures to top Republican officials ranging from former Attorney General John Mitchell, former Vice President Spiro Agnew, and even former President Richard Nixon. “They all had their hand out,” Soghanalian said. On the battlefield Iraq was capturing huge amounts of classified American night vision and other devices that had been supplied to Iran through Israel. “Saddam knew the Americans were screwing him and that was ruining relations,” Soghanalian said. “The policy was to have as many Iraqis and Iranians kill each other as possible. By 1983 the death toll was approaching 800,000 for both sides.”
In Lebanon, the Iranians could make their wrath toward the Americans felt by using Hezbollah, a Shi’a group that was building a huge militia in the Beirut slums. They wanted to punish Americans for supporting Saddam Hussein (who was also arming the Palestinians in Lebanon) and Israel (which had invaded southern Lebanon in 1978).
The United States Marines were encamped at Beirut International Airport as part of a multi-national peacekeeping force. In the summer of 1983, John McCain, then a new Arizona congressman was worried. He had supported President Ronald Reagan’s request for funds to deploy the Marines to Lebanon. Now he was having second thoughts. When asked to vote on more funding to keep the Marines encamped around Beirut International Airport, he voted no and told colleagues that Reagan was making the Marines “sitting ducks.”
Early on a cool Sunday morning in October 1983, a DIA officer on duty for the United States in Lebanon would later say, “The price for Nabih Berri’s relationship with Iran came due.”
Berri’s Amal Militia tightly controlled the area around the Beirut International Airport where the U.S. Marines were encamped. Fawuz Younis and his associate, American Cleven Holt, now known as Issa Abdullah, controlled access to the blocked roads that led to the Marine barracks. Abdullah is nearly a head taller than Younis and has a large scar over his eye, caused when a board from a barricade during a skirmish at the airport hit his face. American Marines thought the genial Abdullah was one of their fellow deployed Marines. Abdullah found that useful.
Abdullah, along with David Belfield (Dawud Salahuddin), the American exiled in Iran, had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Before coming to Lebanon, Abdullah had carried out missions for Iran and pledged jihad against any enemy of Islam. In 1977, he first became known to U.S. authorities when he was arrested for trying to break into Air Force One when Jimmy Carter was president. Abdullah skillfully cultivated American intelligence officers in the United States and overseas. His fearlessness and ability to penetrate U.S. operations and installations made him enormously useful first to Amal and later to Iran who assigned him to work directly with Hezbollah. Younis described Abdullah as a fierce fighter. The large African American man easily blended in with US Marines.
One mystery that still torments American law enforcement is how Abdullah is able to travel back and forth freely to the United States. On a cool October morning in Beirut in 1983, the CIA officers who thought Abdullah was one of their sources were about to learn his true capabilities.
Although President Reagan vowed to keep the military in Lebanon and his vice president, George H.W. Bush, said the United States “would not be cowed by terrorists,” four months later, the US withdrew its troops. President Reagan took no action against Tehran on advice from Casey and the CIA. His inaction set a pattern for future administration responses to terrorism.
Younis says that his former colleague Abdullah “played a role” in the bombing that destroyed the Marine barracks and killed hundreds of Americans. But curiously, despite Abdullah’s connections to Iran and Hezbollah, the CIA officers who worked with Abdullah said nothing to law enforcement. Instead, he travels freely back and forth to the United States, sometimes holding jobs in Washington, D.C. Abdullah’s wife at the time (1983) taught at the Rockville, Maryland, Islamic Center. Despite Marines identifying Abdullah, the FBI and other investigators never questioned him about the bombing.
If Amal had a star officer in 1985, it was Fawaz Younis. By then an Amal captain, he was entrusted with his first terrorist mission — from Berri’s viewpoint the most important of assignments. In May 1985, according to Younis, Berri’s “senior commander ordered me to prepare the attack and hijacking of a Jordanian jetliner. Amal wanted to send a message to the Arab League about the continued Palestinian presence in Lebanon being unfair and unacceptable to Lebanese Shi’a. I was to select and lead a team to take a Royal Jordanian Airlines plane and its passengers and fly it to the Arab League meeting in Tunisia as a protest to the return of Palestinians to Lebanon.”
| Watch Younis describe the hijacking plan. |
Younis quickly determined that he would need assistance inside the airport to take the Royal Jordanian plane. His commanders in Amal “made possible whatever I needed.” Since Amal controlled access to the Beirut Airport, Younis could use Amal cohorts working inside the facility. The plan was to hijack the plane while it was still on the ground and wire it with high explosives before it took off. In 1985 there were no jetways at Beirut International. The Royal Jordanian Boeing aircraft had a built-in rear stairway and used an old-fashioned mobile stairway at the front entrance.
Younis and his three Amal colleagues timed their arrival in a green Lebanese security car just before the eight-person air marshal team boarded the flight. The air marshals were caught off guard; they believed Younis and his team were security personnel. This allowed Younis’s team to take control of the aircraft within three minutes without firing a shot.
Employees at Beirut International had tipped Younis off that the air marshals could be identified because they had no boarding cards. “When we confiscated all the tickets and passports,” Younis recalls, “there were eight without boarding cards . . . That is how we identified the air marshals. We tied the men up with their belts and neckties. There were just two Americans among the hostages on the Royal Jordanian flight.” Military explosives were brought onto the aircraft, put in place, and wired for immediate detonation.
Meanwhile, Younis says, “After we got the aircraft under control one of the flight attendants said there was actually a ninth air marshal, posing as a female member of the flight crew. I locked the pilot in the cabin with me and ordered him to take off for Tunis where the Arab League was meeting.” Inside the cabin during the ordeal his three subordinates beat several of the tied-up air marshals.
According to Younis and US intelligence officials, Beirut authorities under Berri’s control made no attempt to prevent the takeoff. Younis was under orders to keep everyone alive and to use the hijacking to make a simple point to the Arab League membership: It was time to get the Palestinians out of Lebanon. Younis focused on that goal as the logistics of his hijacking became much more complicated.
The pilot told Younis that Tunisia was refusing to allow the plane to land. While negotiations began between Berri and the Arab League, the aircraft was permitted to land in Cyprus for refueling and to pick up food for the passengers. Younis feared a rescue attempt would be made in Cyprus: “I knew they would try and storm the plane. But we needed the fuel to continue. It became clear that I had to force a takeoff before they made an attempt to get people aboard.” After the hasty refueling Younis ordered the pilot to head for Tunis again.
The Cyprus tower tried to stop the takeoff, but the pilot took off too quickly for them. Once again, however, the tower at Tunis refused permission to land, this time saying the runway was blocked. Angry, Younis threaten to crash-land the plane at Tunis. Then there was another tense but brief stop at Palermo, Italy, for refueling.
| Watch Younis describe the actual hijacking. |
Berri had been putting out a series of statements making it clear he was negotiating a peaceful solution to the hijacking he had secretly ordered. Now, to break the impasse, he announced that the Arab League would send a representative to Beirut to meet over the Palestinian question. Younis, following orders, told the pilot to return the plane to Beirut. After the landing Younis took the political spotlight for the first time in his life. After allowing all the passengers to disembark to safety, and with his fellow Amal Militia members nearby, he read a four-page statement denying he was a terrorist and reminding the world that nobody had died during the incident and the only point was to get the Arab League to help stop the violence between the Palestinians and Shi’a in Lebanon, which the Arab League now agreed to do.
After Younis read his statement, the aircraft was moved to a safe distance from the terminal. Younis gave the command, and TV cameras recorded the blast destroying the airliner. Younis slipped away to an Amal safe house in West Beirut, savoring his successful operation. Before the world’s media Berri took full credit for the safe return of the hostages. His credibility with Hezbollah increased, and, despite the fact that some US intelligence officers who worked with Berri warned in writing that he was behind the hijackings, the United States publicly applauded his successful ending of the crisis. Younis says he got a call at the safe house from his commanders to stand by for further orders.
Because only two Americans had been on the Jordanian plane, the hijacking received less attention in the United States than some had hoped. But according to Younis, Amal, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad had a plan that would soon remedy that problem.
Unbeknownst to Younis, when he was planning the Royal Jordanian hijacking, a second hijacking was also in the works. This one, scheduled just five days after Younis’s, involved an American plane. On the morning of June 14, 1985, a Trans World Airlines 727 would be hijacked shortly after its takeoff from Athens, Greece. In just five days, two planes would be taken, and Berri orchestrated events so that he, as the mediator, would save the day in both hijackings. His Amal Militia would guarantee the safety of the hostages. The double hijacking operation amounted to Amal stepping into the big leagues of Middle East politics, as Berri established his reputation as a statesman.
The predictability of the airline business is what makes the big gleaming national symbols such ideal terrorist targets. The power the big airliners project is an illusion that cannot be maintained without local cooperation and staffing. That is the weakness, of course: “The last group of people to have access to the plane before a flight,” Younis explains, “are the cleaning and service crews. What makes international air travel susceptible to terrorism is people who have access to the aircraft can be easily recruited either for ideological or financial reasons.”
On the night of June 13, 1985, a ritual that takes place in hundreds of airports around the world was being played out. The unglamorous job of cleaning cabins and restrooms and preparing planes for the next day’s travel was done by people largely invisible to the flying public. In the airport hierarchy, flight crews catch the public’s attention and imagination. They are treated with a level of respect that the ground crews, airport support staff, mechanics, and most of all the cleaning crews are never given. For Hezbollah and Amal, Younis says, “Small payments and kindnesses easily were rewarded with favors and information from these people.”
This time the weapons were stowed in the restrooms of the extended Boeing 727 after being smuggled through the transit lounge. No one wanted a repeat of the situation in the Royal Jordanian hijacking where four hijackers found themselves up against nine armed security people. This time machine guns were put aboard by the cleaning crew. Additional weapons were smuggled into the transit area of Athens Airport and carried on board by the hijackers.
On the morning of June 14, TWA 847 took off uneventfully. It was the height of the tourist season and the plane was full, with 153 passengers and crew on board, this time almost all Americans. Ten minutes after the plane was airborne, two of the hijackers headed toward the restrooms and retrieved the prepositioned weapons. Mohammed Hammadi and Hasan Izz-al-Din then violently took over the plane, running up and down the main and first-class cabin pistol-whipping passengers while brandishing hand grenades.
Chief Stewardess Uli Derickson was used to gain access to the cockpit. The hijackers then pistol-whipped the flight crew and ordered the pilot to fly to Algiers. Once in control of the aircraft, the hijackers ordered Derickson to collect all passports and separate US civilians from military personnel. The terrorists then ordered the military personnel into the first-class section one at a time for questioning, beginning with a young US Navy diver named Robert Stethem. The hijackers used electrical cord to bind his arms and then began beating him. “Things were out of control on the plane,” Younis says. “Islamic Jihad’s hijackers behaved without much discipline.” That’s when Younis received the call from his Amal commander to report back to the Beirut Airport for a very sensitive mission. Five days after his own hijacking, Amal’s leadership believed that unless Younis could take over the aircraft from the Islamic Jihad/Hezbollah team, Americans would die and the entire operation would backfire.
Captain John Testrate was forced to fly between Beirut and Algiers several times while the hijackers retained control of the plane. Several other passengers were also beaten. As Younis and his team posed as a crew prepared to service the plane at Beirut, the situation got much worse. Stethem, who had regained consciousness, was shot in the head and his body heaved through the door onto the tarmac. Younis boarded the aircraft and immediately issued orders in Arabic to the rattled Islamic Jihad terrorists. “My orders were to get control of the situation . . . to buy time to allow Berri to get negotiations going,” Younis recalls. Groups of the 152 remaining people on the plane were removed by Amal and dispersed throughout Beirut as Berri began negotiations with the United States.
The Reagan-Bush assertion that the United States does not negotiate with terrorists proved to be not only false, but patently absurd. The United States was protecting, arming, and training terrorists across the Middle East and South Asia.
President Reagan needs a win in the war on terrorism so the CIA creates the perfect alternative to attacking Iran
